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Abstract 
Evidence is presented that economic development requires both human capital and physical 
capital and that historically human capital has been the limiting factor in national development.  
Education has direct and indirect effects on national income.  Evidence is presented that the 
indirect effects are very large and larger than the direct effects in poor countries.  The indirect 
effects are not very large and are smaller than the direct effects in rich countries.  Investment in 
education has diminishing returns.  Macro returns exceed 50 percent in poorly-educated 
countries and 12 percent in highly-educated countries.   
 
  
 Structured Abstract 
Background 
This paper was prepared to contribute to a special issue on the value of education. 
Purpose 
The paper examines the role of education in economic development from both a 
theoretical and a historic perspective, addresses why education has been the limiting factor 
determining development historically, discusses why certain countries have provided education 
to the masses and others have not, provides estimates of the quantitative importance of the 
direct and indirect effects of education on the economy, calculates the marginal macro return 
on investment for 61 countries, and examines the implications of these results for government 
policy.   
Methodology 
The paper presents the results from other studies and estimates the marginal product of 
education and of physical capital and the relative importance of post-secondary education in 
2005 using cross-country estimates of national income and the stocks of human capital and 
physical capital.  The estimates of the stocks of human capital were developed from historic 
rates of public and private investment in schooling, the cost of capital during schooling, and 
students’ foregone earnings.     
Results 
The paper presents evidence that education has direct and indirect effects on national 
output.   Educated workers raise national income directly because schooling raises their marginal 
productivity.  The affect national income indirectly by increasing the marginal productivity of 
physical capital and of other workers.  In highly-educated countries the spillover effect on other 
workers is minimal, but the effect on physical capital productivity is important.  In less-
educated countries the spillover effect on the productivity of other workers appears to be much 
larger.  In all countries the positive effect of rising human capital on the productivity of physical 
capital is required to offset the diminishing returns to investment in physical capital and make 
rising investment in physical capital financially viable in the development process.  
The empirical results indicate that investment in schooling is subject to diminishing 
returns, but that the macro marginal return is still considerable in highly-educated countries, 
over 12 percent in 2005.  In less-educated countries the marginal macro returns are much 
larger, in excess of 50 percent, but since most of this return is indirect, the magnitude of the 
marginal returns to education is not generally appreciated.  The results also indicate that 
investment in post-secondary education does not provide any additional effect on national 
income beyond the effect of investment in education generally.  
Conclusions 
These very high macro marginal returns to education make it possible for poor countries 
to grow very rapidly if they make a major public commitment to raising the average level of 
schooling of the masses 
  
.   
I.  Introduction 
Economic development, defined here as the increase in national production of goods 
and services, is a complex process, and economists have had a difficult time identifying the 
factors that determine whether and how it occurs.  At its core the process is one in which 
capital and labor are combined in ever more sophisticated and productive ways, but it has not 
been clear why certain countries advance in this process much more rapidly than others.    
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith [1776] identified “the acquired and useful 
abilities of all the inhabitants or members of the society,” or what is now called “human 
capital,” as one of the four types of fixed capital that contribute to production in a national 
economy.1  But subsequently when factories replaced skilled artisans as the principal means of 
production, economists concentrated on the role of physical capital in development and forgot 
about human capital.  In the 1920s Cobb and Douglas [1928] observed that economic growth in 
the U.S. could be explained by the growth of physical capital and labor and a productivity trend.  
So when National Accounts were created in the 1930s, the capital account included only 
physical capital.   
After World War II the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
was created to facilitate the financing of physical capital projects in countries damaged by the 
war and in poor countries.   At the time economists believed that countries were poor because 
they lacked physical capital.   The presumption was that due to adverse institutional 
characteristics, private individuals in poor countries either did not have the wherewithal or 
lacked the confidence to invest in capital projects.  The IBRD proceeded to provide financing for 
physical capital projects, but many of these projects were unsuccessful.     
Some economists began to wonder if poor countries might be poor because they lacked 
human capital.   Schultz [1961] observed that rich countries devastated in World War II were 
able to quickly employ massive amounts of new physical capital, while the poorest countries 
seemed unable to successfully utilize even small amounts.  He theorized that a nation’s 
capability to productively use physical capital is a function of its level of human capital and that 
if its human capital does not increase in conjunction with its physical capital, then it becomes 
the factor limiting economic development.  Shultz further observed that human capital is more 
likely to be the factor constraining development because foreign investors are eager to invest in 
physical capital, but not in human capital.   
                                                          
1
 Smith, Adam, 1976 (1776), University of Chicago Press, p. 298 
Economists now accept that investment in education, or human capital, is an important 
element in the economic development process.  Econometric studies provide very strong and 
consistent evidence that more educated workers are more productive and that they earn 
higher salaries [Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004].  These results support Adam Smith’s view 
that acquired abilities are a form of capital.   
There also is no doubt that average levels of education and national income rise 
simultaneously.  But doubts remain as to whether they rise together because education drives 
development, or rather because people demand more education as they acquire more income.  
And some economists continue to question whether the very large effects of education on GDP 
found in some studies indicate that education has large indirect effects or that other factors 
affecting GDP were not included.  
In the U.N.’s [2009] System of National Accounts 2008 (SNA), education is identified as 
an asset in the broad sense of the term, but not as a fixed asset because it transfers rather than 
creates knowledge.  Based on this logic the SNA classifies schooling as the consumption of 
education services, not as investment in human capital.           
So the dilemma for public policy is clear.  If education is primarily consumption, then 
public funds for education should be cut in difficult times.  But if it is primarily investment, then 
any cuts could have serious future repercussions.   And if it is THE primary determinant of 
economic development, then in poor countries particularly, expenditures on education should 
be increased even in difficult times.  
In this paper I elaborate on Schultz’s theory that education plays a large and critical role 
in the economic development process and that it most likely is the limiting factor in this 
process.  I present evidence that supports this theory and I offer an explanation for why 
historically certain nations provided education to the masses much sooner than others.  
Subsequently I present the empirical results from a model of the direct and indirect effects of 
education on GDP that is consistent with Schultz’s theories, and I show the quantitative 
importance of these different effects in rich and poor countries.  I then use the estimated 
parameters from this model to estimate the marginal product of schooling in 61 countries in 
2005 and investigate whether investment in post-secondary education has a larger effect on 
national income than investment in lower levels of schooling.  Finally, I discuss the policy 
implications of these results.    
II.  Evidence for Schultz’s Theory of Economic Development 
Figure 1 shows the stocks of human capital and physical capital in 2005 for 61 countries 
that historically had market economies and did not rely primarily on resource extraction to 
create income.  I estimated these stocks using the standard OECD [2001] methodology, which 
estimates each nation’s cumulative investment in each type of capital and then depreciates this 
investment over its expected life.2   In the case of human capital, the investment includes public 
and private expenditures on formal schooling, the implicit financing costs during students’ 
schooling, and students’ foregone earnings.   As shown in the figure, the differences between 
rich and poor countries are enormous.  Capital/adult differs by a factor of up to 100. 
 
Figure 1 
Stocks of Human Capital and Physical Capital in 2005  
 
The observed relationship between the two capital stocks is consistent with Schultz’s 
theory that human capital and physical capital are complementary.  There is some variation in 
the relative amounts of the two types of capital, but no countries have high levels of only one 
type.  For example, the U.S. has more human than physical capital, while Japan has more 
                                                          
2
 For physical capital the investment is for the period 1965 to 2004, while for the human capital the investment is 
for 1965 to 2000.  Physical capital has an assumed geometric depreciation rate of 6 percent.  Human capital has an 
assumed linear depreciation rate of 2.5%.   Both stocks are calculated using economic data from Penn World Table 
(PWT) 6.3 [Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009].  The methodology for the calculation of the human capital stock is 
presented in Breton [2012]. 
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physical than human capital, but both countries have high levels of both.  The correlation 
coefficient between the two kinds of capital in this data set is 0.87.   
These data show that economic development does not occur automatically.  If it did, 
there would not be such large differences in the magnitude of the capital stocks between 
countries.  Clearly some characteristic(s) of the more developed countries, not present in the 
less developed countries, facilitated historic investment in both types of capital.   It is also 
evident that whatever these characteristics are, they vary widely across countries because 
levels of capital/adult vary widely.  If human capital and physical capital are complementary, 
then historically either type of capital or both could have been the factor limiting investment in 
the other type of capital.     
All of the countries in Figure 1 historically have had a market economy, and national 
statistics show that investment has been flowing between these countries for some time 
[Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004].  So it is not a priori evident that a shortage of financial capital has 
limited economic development.  Caselli and Feyrer [2007] show that the marginal product of 
reproducible physical capital in 1996 was very similar in 43 developed and undeveloped 
countries.  Implicitly local and global private investors have provided financing for those capital 
projects that had attractive returns, so any recent failure to develop apparently has not been 
due to any shortage of financial capital.      
But as Shultz [1961] observed years ago, there is no evidence that local and global 
investors provided financing for human capital in these countries.  So even though human 
capital and physical capital appear to be similar in their effect on economic output, they 
apparently are not similar from a private investment standpoint. Why not? 
These types of capital may appear similar to economists, but for accountants they are 
very different.  In a poor country human capital is created by investing in the education of a 
child, which is very different from investing in a factory.  The factory is a transferable fixed 
asset, and education is not.  Centuries ago, private investors could and occasionally did invest in 
children’s education, with a contractual guarantee of repayment through the indentured 
servitude of the child [Clark, 1977].  Today such arrangements typically are illegal, and without 
them the private financing of a poor child’s education is not feasible.    
Even if private financing were feasible, in a poor country the parents’ incentives to 
finance their child’s schooling are weak or even negative for several reasons.  First, if the child is 
working, enrollment of the child in school immediately reduces the parents’ income.  Second, 
the period over which the parents would have to continually borrow is quite long, and the 
period they would have to carry the loan before it could be paid off would be considerably 
longer.  Such long loan periods substantially increase the financing risk and cost.  Third, if the 
investment pays off in higher income for the child, the parents may not benefit, since they 
would have no legal right to this income after the child reaches maturity.   
Precisely because the parents have no right to the future income from the investment in 
the child’s schooling, they cannot collateralize the investment, so they would have to pay a very 
high rate of interest for a high-risk loan.  For this reason Mincer [1984] argues that historically 
only the children of the rich have been educated in response to market forces. 
III.  History of Mass Schooling and Economic Development 
   So how have some countries managed to create a highly-educated population?  
Easterlin [1981] observes that historically the schooling of the masses has occurred only when 
ideological or political forces made it a priority. 
The Jews appear to have been the first people to commit to mass schooling.  After the 
destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE, religious leaders required every Jewish family 
to educate their male offspring to enable them to study the Torah.  Botticini and Eckstein 
[2007] argue that this religious obligation created the first educated community, but the 
members of this community had to disperse to put their education to economic use.  The Jews 
became a wealthy people, but no single country developed as a result.   
The first national commitment to the schooling of the masses appears to have occurred 
in the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century.  The leaders of the Protestant sects in 
northern Europe promoted literacy to enable their members to read the Bible and learn 
religious catechism.  This religious obligation launched the first significant efforts to create 
schools for the poor [Bowen, 1981]. 
Numerous reports document the increase in literacy that accompanied the Protestant 
Reformation [Cipolla, 1969].  Competition between Protestant and Catholic religious groups to 
attract believers further spurred the provision of free or subsidized schooling for the poor in 
regions where both groups were active [Houston, 1988].  For the next three centuries literacy 
increased steadily in Europe, largely through the use of religious catechisms.  By 1700 35-40 
percent of the population in Protestant Europe could read, while in Southern Catholic Europe 
less than 20 percent were literate [Johannson, 1977]. 
During the course of the 19th century, nation-building became the dominant political 
ideology in Europe, and as part of this process the state increasingly imposed obligatory public 
schooling on the masses [Ramirez and Boli, 1987].  In the struggle over control of the 
educational system, Pope Pius IX issued an encyclical in 1864 in which he forbade Catholics 
from accepting civil education [Johnson, 1976].  
The Catholic Church’s opposition to public schooling slowed the provision of schooling 
to the poor in southern Catholic Europe and in the Iberian colonies.  As national levels of 
education increased from 1850 to 1940, northern Protestant Europe maintained their historic 
advantage relative to southern Catholic Europe, with particularly large differences relative to 
Spain and Portugal [Benavot and Riddle, 1988].  In 1940 primary school enrollment ratios were 
about 70 percent in northern Europe and its settlements, 60 percent in Italy, and 35 percent in 
Iberia and its settlements.   
No comparable commitment to mass schooling occurred outside of Europe and some of 
its settlements until much later [Craig, 1981].  Japan is the principal exception, in that it had 
levels of primary enrollment in 1870 that were comparable to those in southern Europe 
[Benavot and Riddle, 1988].  Subsequently, in the 20th century the European model of a 
national society, including state funding for mass schooling, spread throughout the world 
[Ramirez and Boli, 1987].  A review of the historical record shows that nations’ cultural and 
political propensities to accept missionary schooling or to provide their own charitable or state 
funds for mass schooling have determined their average level of human capital today.      
According to Schultz’s theory, beginning in the 16th century as the stock of human 
capital increased in response to ideological and political developments, expected returns on 
investment in physical capital increased, and rising investment increased the stock of physical 
capital.  As the stocks of human and physical capital increased, national income rose.   
Anecdotal data suggest that economic development has been linked to literacy and  
schooling since the 16th century, but comprehensive data on national levels of education are 
only available for a subset of the more educated countries since the mid-19th century.  Figure 2 
shows the relationship between the average schooling attainment of the population age 15 to 
64 and national income for 43 countries in 1910 and in 2000.3  In 1910 the highest average level 
of schooling in any of these countries was less than eight years.  In 2000 the highest average 
level of schooling had increased to 13 years.  The trend lines in 1910 and 2000 show that over 
this period the relationship between average schooling and GDP/capita did not change for 
countries with average schooling levels below five years.  At higher levels of schooling the 
associated level of GDP/capita increased substantially over this period.   
 
 
                                                          
3 The schooling data are from Morrisson and Murtin [2009].  The GDP/capita data are from Maddisson [2003], but 
the units were converted from 1996 US$ to 2005$ using data from PWT 6.3.  
 
Figure 2 
Average Schooling and GDP/capita in 1910 and 2000 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between human capital/adult and GDP/adult in 2005, 
using the same human capital data shown in Figure 1.4  The strong relationship between these 
variables is evident.  The higher levels of human capital in countries with greater Protestant 
affiliation is also evident.  
IV.  Methodology for Estimating the Returns to Education 
If Schultz’s theory that human capital and physical capital are complementary is correct, 
then education has both direct and indirect effects on national income, and an estimate of the 
returns to investment in education should take both into account.  The standard methodologies 
widely used to estimate the returns to education include only the direct effect on workers’ 
salaries.  Estimation of the larger returns to the nation requires a model of the effect of 
education on national income that includes the direct and the indirect effects.    
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil [1992] created a model of national income (Y) that is 
consistent with Schultz’s theory of capital-skill complementarity.  This model includes three 
factors of production, human capital (H), physical capital (K), and labor (L): 
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 The data for GDP/adult are from PWT 6.3, but they include my estimate of students’ foregone earnings.   
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The model is a Cobb-Douglas production function, similar to the one Cobb and Douglas created 
in the 1920s, but with an additional factor for human capital.  This model intrinsically includes a 
direct and two indirect effects for each factor of production [Breton, 2012].  In the case of 
human capital, it has a direct effect on the salary received by the educated worker and indirect 
effects on the productivity of physical capital and on the productivity of other workers (labor).   
 
Figure 3 
Human Capital/Adult and GDP/Adult in 2005  
 
 
Figure 4 shows the dynamics of this model in response to an increase in schooling.  The 
increase in schooling increases the nation’s human capital.  Human capital then has a direct 
effect on national income (the solid line) and indirect effects on the productivity of the other 
two factors (the dotted lines).  The figure also shows a third indirect effect (labeled “4”), which 
is the positive feedback that rising income has on the society’s demand for education.   
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Figure 4:  Effect of Schooling on National Income in a Market Economy 
 
When connected to the global financial capital market, this model simulates the effect 
on physical capital that follows a national decision to increase the level of schooling.   After a 
lag the increase in schooling increases the stock of human capital in the work force, which 
raises the marginal productivity of physical capital and the expected return on investment.   
Private investors then increase their investment in physical capital, which has a direct effect on 
national income and an indirect effect on the productivity of human capital and labor.  As these 
various effects work their way through the economy, economic output rises and national 
income increases along with it.        
Conveniently, the marginal product of human capital in this model (i.e., the increase in 
national income associated with an increase in human capital) provides an estimate of the full 
macro marginal return on investment in schooling, including the direct and the two indirect 
effects: 
(2) MPH = δY/δH = βY/H   
Given an estimate of β for the model in equation (1) and estimates of GDP/adult and human 
capital/adult, the marginal return on investment in schooling can be estimated for any country.  
In addition, when combined with an estimate of α and information on the direct marginal effect 
of education on salaries from micro studies, the two indirect effects of human capital can be 
estimated [Breton, 2012]. 
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V.  Estimates of Macro Returns to Education 
Breton [2012] shows that this model provides estimates of the macro effect of schooling 
on income that are consistent with micro studies of the direct effect of schooling on workers’ 
salaries in 36 countries.  The trends in these direct and indirect (external) effects are shown in 
Figure 5.  They show that in 1990 the marginal product of schooling estimated in workers’ 
earnings studies varied from 8 percent in the most educated countries to 13 percent in the least 
educated countries.  The external marginal product varied from 6 percent in the most educated 
countries to 40 percent in the least educated countries.  These results indicate that the indirect 
effects of education are less than the direct effects in highly-educated countries, but they are 
much larger than the direct effects in countries with low average levels of education.  The 
combined direct and indirect return to education in the countries with the lowest educational 
levels was over 50 percent.       
 
Figure 5:  Direct (Market) and External Returns to Education in 1990 
 
The estimates of the total external benefits of schooling in Figure 5 can be allocated to 
physical capital and labor using the data provided in Breton’s [2012] study.  This allocation is 
shown in Figure 6.  The implication is that the spillover effect of a more educated individual on 
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the productivity of others in a highly-educated work force is very small, but it is considerably 
larger in countries where the work force is less educated.  These results are consistent with the 
few micro studies that estimate the external effect of more educated workers on the wages of 
other workers in countries with different average levels of schooling [Breton, 2012].   
 
Figure 6:  External Returns to Education in 1990 
 
The estimates in Figure 6 indicate that the marginal external effect of human capital on 
the productivity of physical capital is substantial in highly-educated countries, but it diminishes 
noticeably as the level of human capital rises.  The diminishing return evident in all of these 
marginal products indicates that it will be increasingly difficult for highly educated countries to 
increase national income by investing more resources in schooling.    
Most countries have substantially increased their level of human capital since 1990, and 
in this model these increases reduce the marginal return to investment in education.   Figure 7 
shows the total macro returns in 2005, which are analogous to the sum of the direct and the 
external returns shown in Figure 5.  In this set of estimates, Denmark has the lowest marginal 
product, which is 12.2 percent.  This return compares to Denmark’s estimated marginal product 
of 13.5 percent in 1990 [Breton, 2012].  
  VI.  Relative Macro Returns at Different Schooling Levels 
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These estimates measure marginal returns to investment in education in the aggregate, 
but not for different levels of schooling.   In highly educated countries primary and secondary 
schooling is virtually universal, so incremental investment is more likely to occur at the post-
secondary level.  But it also could be increased at lower levels of schooling in an attempt to 
raise the quality of schooling.     
 
Figure 7:  Marginal Product of Human Capital (Macro) in 2005 
 
 
In countries with low average levels of education, schooling is not universal at the 
primary level and is infrequent at the secondary level.  Governments must make choices with 
respect to funding priorities.  Should incremental funds go to expanding university 
opportunities, or to improving either coverage or quality at lower levels of schooling?  This is a 
complex issue, which has serious implications for income inequality, social mobility, and 
political stability.    
Numerous studies have focused on the direct returns to investment in education at 
different levels of schooling.  Older studies have found that the direct returns to education are 
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higher at lower levels of schooling [Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004].   Recent studies 
provide data showing that the salary premium for post-secondary education has been rising 
since 1997 in real terms in most OECD countries [Psacharopoulos, 2009].  These data may 
indicate that direct returns have risen for post-secondary education compared to lower levels 
of schooling.   
Estimates of returns based on workers’ salaries ignore the external effects of schooling, 
which according to Figure 5, are very large in poor countries.  Implicitly these very large 
external returns are associated with increases in schooling at lower levels since this is where 
most schooling occurred in these countries prior to 1990.  Macro returns may be larger for 
investment at lower levels of schooling even if the direct returns are larger for post-secondary 
schooling.   
I examine this issue by estimating the effect of the share of the population with some 
post-secondary schooling on national income in 48 countries, controlling for the level of human 
capital/adult in 2005.  I exclude the sub-Saharan African countries in this analysis, since they 
have virtually no post-secondary schooling.  Although the post-secondary share and the level of 
human capital/adult are positively correlated in these countries (ρ = 0.60), the post-secondary 
share varies substantially in countries with similar levels of human capital/adult.  Figure 8 
shows these data.       
The share of the population with post-secondary education is from a data set for the 
population over 25, which is documented in Cohen and Soto [2007].   These data are not ideal 
since the population includes adults over 65.  I use the estimate in 2010 to represent the share 
of the working population (over 20) with post-secondary education in 2005.  
I estimate two permutations of the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil model in log form:    
(3) log(Y/L) = c + α log(K/L) + β log (H/L)  
(4) log(Y/L) = c + (α/1-α-β) log(K/Y) + (β/1-α-β) log (H/Y)  
I estimate the model in 2005 with and without physical capital because the complementary 
nature of the two forms of capital implicitly makes physical capital an endogenous variable that 
is affected by the level of human capital.   
The bidirectional causality between schooling and income could bias OLS estimates of 
the effect of these variables on national income, so I use the Protestant share of the population 
in 1980 from Barrett [1982] as an instrument for the education variables.  Breton [2012] uses 
this instrument and provides a detailed rationale for its validity.  As described earlier, there is 
considerable evidence that Protestant affiliation has an exogenous effect on a nation’s 
willingness to support schooling for the masses.     
 
Figure 8 
Population Share with Post-Secondary Education vs. Human Capital/Adult in 2005 
 
       
Table 1 presents the results.  Column 1 shows the OLS statistical results for the model in 
equation (3) with human capital/adult alone, which explains 90% of the variation in log 
(Y/adult).   Column 2 shows that when the post-secondary share is added, it has no effect on 
national income.  This test could be unfair because the human capital variable is estimated 
using education’s historic shares of national income, which are highly correlated with current 
income.   
Columns 3 and 4 show the same results for the model in equation (4) that uses log(H/Y) 
as the dependent variable.  In this model (column 4) the post-secondary share has a highly 
statistically-significant, positive effect on national income.  But the estimated coefficients in 
these models may be biased because while education affects national income, national income 
also affects a nation’s level of education.    
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 Table 1 
Effect of Human Capital and Post-Secondary Schooling on National Income 
Dependent variable is log(national income/adult) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Log (H/adult) 0.69* 
(.03) 
0.71* 
(.04) 
      
Log(H/Y)   1.09* 
(.18) 
0.75* 
(.24) 
1.63* 
(.30) 
1.50 
(.70) 
0.94* 
(.30) 
0.88 
(.48) 
Post-Secondary 
Share 
 -0.11 
(.45) 
 2.77* 
(.84) 
 0.80 
(3.74) 
 0.52 
(2.18) 
Log(K/Y)       0.98* 
(.18) 
0.98* 
(.17) 
R2 .90 .91 .33 .43 .25 .31 .66 .69 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*Significant at one percent level 
 
Columns 5 and 6 show the results for the same model using the Protestant share of the 
population in 1980 and the log of this share as instruments for the education variables.5  With 
these instruments the effect of human capital/adult is larger and the effect of the post-
secondary share is smaller and not statistically significant.   Although not shown, the results are 
similar if the sample is limited to the more educated countries.  Columns 7 and 8 show the 2SLS 
results when physical capital is included in the model.  Again the estimated coefficient on the 
post-secondary share is small and not statistically significant.   
The implication of the different outcomes using OLS and 2SLS estimates is that a 
nation’s cumulative investment in education raises national income and this increase in income 
raises the demand for post-secondary education.   The small, statistically-insignificant 
coefficient on the post-secondary share indicates that post-secondary investment has no 
incremental effect on national income beyond the effect from investment in education 
generally.  Implicitly there is no loss in national income if the government chooses to extend 
                                                          
5
 The first stage regressions are:  Log(H/Y) = 0.56* + 0.05 log(ProtSh) + 0.65* ProtSh    R
2 
= .38 
       (.15)      (.03)      (.24) 
                           PostSecSh = 0.28* + 0.023* log(ProtSh) - 0.01ProtSh)    R
2 
= .27 
         (.04)     (.007)           (.05)  
primary and secondary schooling to more of the population instead of increasing post-
secondary schooling for those that already have secondary schooling.   
VII.  Implications for Public Policy 
The empirical evidence indicates that the macro marginal returns to investment in 
education are very large in countries with less-educated populations but are much lower in 
countries with highly-educated populations.  What are the implications of this evidence for 
government policy related to public the funding of education?     
Given the obstacles to private financing at the primary and secondary levels of 
schooling, state support at these levels need to be very substantial to achieve an optimal level 
of national education.  All countries with high levels of human capital provide free, obligatory 
public schooling or public funds for private schooling through the secondary level.  The 
evidence indicates that if poor countries wish to develop, they also must provide this financial 
support for primary and secondary schooling.   
At the post-secondary level the optimal level of state support is less obvious because 
this education can be privately financed to some degree.  In countries with low average levels 
of education, the external benefits of incremental schooling are so great that government 
support for post-secondary education is justified.  However, in the event that public funds are 
limited, the empirical results indicate that these funds are best spent providing primary and 
secondary education for all.  Once students have achieved this level of schooling, those that 
wish to continue their education may be able to privately finance these studies.  In contrast, if 
government support is not forthcoming at lower levels of schooling, it is unlikely that poor 
students will continue in school.   
Some highly-educated countries currently provide very substantial subsidies for post-
secondary education.  Given the diminishing returns from investment in human capital, are 
these subsidies too extensive?  Should governments reduce these subsidies and require 
students to finance a larger share of their education themselves?   
At the macro level this question has two aspects.  The first is whether the relative 
subsidies (or taxes) for human capital and physical capital are optimal.   Both types of capital 
are required for income growth, and the rate of growth will be suboptimal if government 
policies result in very different marginal returns for the two types of capital.  The second 
question is, how low does the macro marginal return have to fall before government support is 
no longer justified?  
The Mankiw, Romer, and Weil model provides information useful for answering the first 
question, because it provides estimates of the marginal product of both human capital and 
physical capital for each country.  If the marginal product of human capital is less than the 
marginal product of physical capital, then the nation may be overinvesting in human capital and 
vice-versa.   
Figure 9 shows the ratio of the marginal products MPH/MPK for 48 countries in 2005.  
This analysis shows that the marginal returns to education are equal or greater than the returns 
to physical capital for most countries.  Some countries with low levels of human capital 
apparently have higher returns on physical capital, but this indicates either that their macro 
data are not accurate or that they are under-investing in both kinds of capital.   
 
Figure 9 
Relative Returns to Human Capital and Physical Capital in 2005 
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A few countries with high levels of human capital (above $125,000/adult) also have 
returns to physical capital that exceed the returns to human capital.    The implication is that tax 
and subsidy policies in these countries are not optimal in their encouragement of investment in 
the two kinds of capital.  As the marginal returns to education continue to decline, these 
countries should reexamine their policies for promoting investment in these two kinds of 
capital.   
Assuming the aggregate marginal returns are similar for both kinds of capital, is there a 
marginal return below which investment is counterproductive?  Implicitly, yes, but that point 
does not appear to have been reached in any country.  Denmark has the lowest estimated 
return on investment in human capital in 2005, and this return is 12.2 percent.  This return still 
substantially exceeds the cost of financial capital.  But this is an aggregate return, and returns 
on particular types of education are undoubtedly more and less than this rate.  As the 
aggregate return continues to fall, investment in more types of education are likely to fall below 
the cost of financial capital.  Optimal policy requires that subsidies for education be increasingly 
targeted on those types of education that offer the higher returns.    
VIII.  Conclusions 
This paper presents evidence that human capital and physical capital are both required 
for economic development and that each has a positive external effect on the productivity of 
the other.   The evidence also indicates that human capital is more likely to be the limiting 
factor in economic development.   
Human capital is created initially by providing children with primary and secondary 
schooling.  Private financing of this type of investment is not feasible for poor children.   
Countries that are highly developed today have a long history of providing free or highly-
subsidized education to the poor.  A review of their history suggests that the initial impetus for 
this schooling had a religious basis, but that as the public’s level of education and income rose, 
their demand for schooling rose, and the financial support from private donors was replaced or 
greatly augmented by public funds from the state.  If poor countries wish to achieve high levels 
of national income, they need to provide public funding for the education of the poor, at least 
at the primary and secondary levels of schooling.    
The evidence on returns to education indicates that investment in schooling is subject to 
diminishing returns, but that the macro marginal return on all education is still considerable in 
highly-educated countries, over 12 percent in 2005.  In less-educated countries the marginal 
macro returns are much larger, in excess of 50 percent, but since most of this return is indirect, 
the magnitude of the marginal returns to education is not generally appreciated.  These very 
high macro marginal returns to education make it possible for poor countries to grow very 
rapidly if they make a major commitment to raising the average level of schooling.   
The evidence also indicates that educated workers raise the marginal productivity of 
physical capital and of other workers.  In the highly educated countries the spillover effect on 
other workers is very small, but un less-educated countries this effect appears to be much 
larger.  In all countries the positive effect of rising human capital on the productivity of physical 
capital is required to offset the diminishing returns to investment and make rising investment in 
physical capital financially viable in the development process.  
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